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1 Introduction
A highly educated labor force is instrumental for advances in productivity and hence
for economic growth 1. This makes public provision of education a central policy area
for governments in all countries, especially in developed nations, where advanced
technologies and high living standards are dependent on maintaining high levels of
productivity.
However, allocating public resources for education in the developed countries in-
volves more trade-o¤s now than in the past. On the one hand, mounting social
security and health expenditures have put public budgets under pressure and implic-
itly the resources devoted to education. On the other hand, technological progress
has emphasized the distinction between general skills (acquired during primary and
secondary education) and specialized skills (produced during tertiary education), so
that not only the size, but also the composition of the public spending for education
becomes a critical policy issue. This trade-o¤ is further complicated by the hierar-
chical nature of education. Individuals accumulate basic or general skills during a
rst stage of education. The attained quality of those skills is crucial for the returns
of more advanced education, which builds advanced specialized skills. This brings
the natural question on how the education policies should be designed, not only in
terms of the budget size, but also the allocation of public resources across di¤erent
educational stages in oder to achieve the goal of increased human capital.
At the same time, recent policy debates on the education nance have empha-
sized the increased role of private contributions in the light of the high private returns
obtained at all education stages (see Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004) for a cal-
culation of these returns). In the OECD countries, signicant co-nancing takes
place at the tertiary and pre-primary educational levels, where respectively 24% and
19% of total funds come from private sources (see OECD (2006)). The participa-
tion in tertiary education increased worldwide in the last two decades, in response
to an increase in both individual and social returns. As a result, the share of pri-
vate resources in the funding of tertiary education has become more important in
both developed and developing countries2. However, while decreased public spending
leads to the crowding-in of private resources, there is a concern that less public funds
might discourage potential students. Thus, insuring the right balance between the
two funding sources is also a key aspect of the educational policies.
1Hanushek and Kimko (2000), Barro (2001), Aghion et al. (2005) Jamison et al. (2006), provide
extensive empirical support to this claim.
2In one-half of the OECD and partner countries, the private share of educational spending
increased by more than 3% during 1995-2003. In Australia, Italy and the United Kingdom, as well
as the partner country Chile this increase exceeded 9% (see OECD (2006)). According to Li (2005),
in China the government contributions have declined drastically, from 83% in 1990 to 50% in 2002.
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Table 1: Size and structure of education expenditure in the European Union and the
United States (% GDP, 2003). Source: OECD, Eurostat, authorscalculations
Private Public Total Growth
K-12 Tertiary Total K-12 Tertiary Total rate1
EU192 0.39 0.33 0.72 4.01 1.26 5.27 6.04 2.55
% 54 46 100 76 24 100
US 0.43 1.61 2.04 4.13 1.47 5.60 7.64 3.20
% 21 79 100 74 26 100
1  Average growth of real GDP per capita (1997-2005)
2  Denotes EU countries that are also members of the OECD.
This paper focuses on the funding trade-o¤s associated with the two major stages
of education, basic (K-12) and tertiary level and considers the following questions:
How do governments and households allocate resources across di¤erent educational
stages? How do private and public education expenditures interact, in the aggregate
and at each stage? How can policy makers use this interaction to maximize the
return on public spending? What are the implications of various educational public
policies on the quality of human capital and consequently, on the growth rate of the
economy?
To see the relevance of these questions, let us consider a salient comparison:
education funding in the United States and the European Union. Table 1 reveals
that public spending on education as a fraction of GDP is approximately the same
in the two entities, while private spending is three times higher in the US than
in the EU. Moreover, the allocation of resources across di¤erent education stages
seems to di¤er widely. In particular, private resources in the US go overwhelmingly
to tertiary education, while in the EU primary and secondary education prevail
in allocation of private funding. While both US and European governments have
allocated education resources similarly, householdsspending on tertiary education
is remarkably di¤erent.
In this paper we analyze the interactions and trade-o¤s that might be responsible
for these outcomes. We use a stylized model of a hierarchical education system: a
compulsory rst stage (K-12) and an optional second stage (tertiary education). The
model is used to analyze the growth-maximizing policy of public spending across
stages, which takes into account the private incentives of individuals to invest in
education.
We nd that:
1) Consistent with data for OECD countries, the pursuit of growth-maximizing
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policies necessitates the share allocated to K-12 education to be predominant in the
public spending on education, irrespective of the total public education budget size;
2) Maintaining strong public support for primary and secondary education in-
creases the total household spending for education and more importantly, the share
of private spending allocated to tertiary education. Interestingly, our results suggest
that it is possible to increase both basic and tertiary education funding by using only
the composition of the public budget to stimulate the private investment.
3) Increasing enrollment at the advanced stage of education does not always
translate into higher growth, when it comes at the expense of decreasing the resources
allocated to the basic stage;
4) Flat income tax levels have noticeable e¤ects on the output growth rate as they
a¤ect the private incentives to invest in education3. In particular, an increase in taxes
diminish the private resources allocated to education and bias their composition to-
ward K-12 stage, where the return on investment is higher, due to enhanced comple-
mentarity between public and private spending. Consequently, growth-maximizing
policies in a high-tax country imply a higher share of public spending allocated to
higher education;
5) Given the di¤erence in the tax levels in the US versus EU, our model supports
an increase in the share of public funds allocated to K-12 in the US and enhanced
public funding for tertiary education in the EU.
Our paper is related to the literature on growth and human capital accumulation.
The di¤erences in growth rates across developed economies have motivated a lot of
debate on the role of education in fostering innovation and growth. Aghion et al.
(2005), Sapir et al. (2003), Krueger and Lindahl (2001), Romer (2000) are just a
few of the studies that address the relationship between human capital investment
and growth. In particular, Aghion et al. (2005) use data for 50 US states to show
that economies which are closer to the technological frontier benet relatively more
from investments in the advanced stages of education. While their result has impor-
tant policy implications, we take the question further and ask how governments can
optimally allocate resources across the education stages. Furthermore, we consider
this question in the context of householdsdecision in response to the government
allocation policy. The existing literature which studies the e¤ects of changing the
mix of education expenditures across K-12 and tertiary level has been mostly con-
cerned with the allocation of either public or private spending across stages, with
only limited attention given to the interaction between the two.
The literature considering education as a hierarchical process is small but rapidly
growing. Driskill and Horowitz (2002) were the rst to investigate the investment in
hierarchical human capital in a dynamic setting. In their study of access to college
3In contrast, Lucas (1990), Stokey and Rebelo (1995), Glomm and Ravikumar (1998) nd that
taxes have negligible growth e¤ects.
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education, Cardak and Givon (2004) use a static framework to analyze two extreme
alternative public policies: making either pre-college schooling or college fully pub-
licly funded. Su (2004) analyzes the dynamic implications of di¤erent allocations of
public funds between basic and advanced education. She considers the case of private
transfers as an extension. However, the setup used does not allow for the reallocation
of the private resources across di¤erent stages or the interaction of private spending
and the government allocation policy.
Restuccia and Urrutia (2004) consider the role of basic and college education in
explaining the intergenerational persistence of earnings and the income inequality.
Blankenau (2005) studies the optimal allocation of public spending across the two
stages of the educational process. In his paper the basic stage is purely funded
by public resources while the tuition in the advanced stage is partially funded by
government subsidies. Kaganovich (2005) models the interaction between private
and public spending in a mixed system of access to higher education (which recently
emerged in Eastern Europe) featuring a two-track admission process: one that is
tuition-free and based on academic performance and the second that charges full
tuition, and is available to less prepared students. Consequently, households need to
allocate their resources between pre-college preparation and/or payment for college.
Finally, Blankenau et al. (2007) study how the allocation of a xed education budget
across K-12 education spending and college subsidies a¤ects welfare and output.
In addition to the papers mentioned above, there is an abundant economic growth
literature where public and private expenditures are inputs in a single stage hu-
man capital production (Glomm and Ravikumar (1992), Eckstein and Zilcha (1994),
Glomm and Ravikumar (1998), Kaganovich and Zilcha (1999), Brauninger and Vidal
(2000), Cassou and Lansing (2003), Bearse et al. (2005)).
This paper contributes to the literature by providing a simple model of hierar-
chical, two-stage education that incorporates both government funding policy and
householdsoptimal decisions with respect to enrollment, overall education spend-
ing and its allocation across stages. Another contribution of the paper is that the
process of hierarchical human capital formation is embedded in a general equilibrium
model of a production economy which employs high and low skilled labor. The model
appears to accomodate empirically relevant values for the elasticity of substitution
between labor inputs of high-school and college graduates.
In our paper private education inputs are provided by parents as intergenerational
altruistic transfers, rather than as self-nancing by students4. Depending on the size
and composition of the government budget for education, we nd the optimal private
inputs at each stage and describe how their relative sizes vary with the total level
of private parental spending on education. Likewise, we analyze how enrollment in
4In Blankenau (2005), young agents take loans to nance the second stage of education, while
the rst stage is provided free of charge by the government.
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higher education responds to the size and structure of public allocations. As noted
above, in addition to the public spending on education, the general tax level has an
e¤ect on both the quantity and quality of education acquired by households. Con-
versely, we study the growth maximizing educational policies when the government
takes the householdsreaction into account.
We analyze education provision in a highly aggregated model economy where
agents di¤er only by educational status. Besides o¤ering analytical tractability, this
simplication enables us to circumvent modelling the institutional details that make
the educational systems in various countries so di¤erent, and hence so di¢ cult to t
in one analytical framework. To maintain generality, we assume, without going into
institutional details, that education quality at each stage is produced by a technology
that combines private and public inputs.
The degree of substitutability between private and public inputs in the various
stages of education is of central importance to the issue analyzed. The literature
has not reached a consensus on this matter. Thinking of these inputs exclusively as
monetary transfers makes a strong case for perfect substitution. However, welfare
and education public policies can have an impact, if any, at the early stages of child
development rather than later5. If human capital investment is considered to include
adequate child health care and nutrition, public spending might be a complement or
a substitute to private spending for children from di¤erent income groups. Moreover,
the public spending can be used in a variety of ways, from vouchers to public schools,
subsidies to private schools or coordination and curricula improvement, each having
potentially di¤erent e¤ects on private resources devoted to education. Moreover,
during K-12 education, most students live with their parents who support room and
board expenditures while at the same time providing the so called "within the family"
education (Nordblom (2003)). This strengthens the argument for complementarity
during early education stages. Houtenville and Conway (2001) bring micro-level ev-
idence in favor of substitutability at K-12 level when the private input considered is
parental time. Kim (2001) nds on the other hand that while poor parents invest
less in the childs human capital when public schooling increases, while rich parents
instead increase their investment. At the aggregate level, Psacharopoulos and Pa-
trinos (2004) show that social returns of primary education are signicant in both
developed and developing countries. The implied externalities suggest that public
inputs might be good complements to private inputs in the production of primary
and secondary education. Similar evidence is less compelling for tertiary education,
as reviewed by Jacobs and van der Ploeg (2005). However, research activities, which
are an important factor on the quality of tertiary education largely rely on public
inputs. This might suggest less than perfect substitutability between private and
5See Cunha and Heckman (2007), Heckman and Masterov (2007), Carneiro and Heckman (2003)
Heckman et al. (1999),LaLonde (1995).
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public inputs at this stage too.
Summing up the above arguments, it appears that the elasticity of substitution
varies with the level of schooling, from low elasticities at early stages to high elasticity
at later stages. In light of the above arguments, we consider a general specication of
education technology where parameters are stage-specic, that allows for a constant
elasticity of substitution (CES), similar to Bearse et al. (2005).
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3
contains the equilibrium analysis of a balanced growth path. Analytical results are
derived for the case of perfect input substitutability in the higher education pro-
duction. In Section 4 we study the e¤ects of changes in the policy parameters on
private resource allocations across the two educational stages and the growth rate of
the economy. Section 5 relaxes the assumption of perfect substitution between pri-
vate and public inputs and undertakes computational analysis of this more complex
model. Section 6 looks at the growth-maximizing policies when government takes
into account householdsdecision rules as functions of public policies parameters us-
ing the numerical results. Section 7 examines the tax level e¤ects on the structure
of both public and private education funding. Section 8 concludes. All proofs are in
the Appendix A.
2 The Model
The economy is populated by a large number of identical households. Each period
a household consists of a parent and a child, so that the population is constant over
time. Each agent lives two periods, called youth and old age. Young agents (children)
get educated in a hierarchical schooling system. When the agents are old, they give
birth to o¤springs, earn a wage specic to the human capital acquired in the rst
period, consume and make an educational transfers to their children. The size of
each generation is normalized to one.
2.1 Households
2.1.1 Childs educational problem
The human capital formation is modeled as a two-stage process. The rst stage is
mandatory and corresponds to the primary and secondary education years (hence-
forth K-12 education). The second stage is optional and corresponds to tertiary
education. Also, to accomplish it, people must give up an exogenous fraction n2 of
their adult working time. Since in most countries, education stages are quite stan-
dardized in duration, we set n2 exogenously. The advanced stage training is pursued
only by a part of the population, t 2 (0; 1). Thus, in equilibrium, a fraction of the
young people will go to college and use the rst stage education to increase their
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human capital. This is the skilled labor supply. Remaining workers will provide
unskilled labor.
Similar to Blankenau (2005), each young agent has perfect foresight and chooses
an education strategy taking the strategy of others as given, such that in equilibrium
their behavior is consistent with the aggregate outcomes. Thus, a young agent at
time t chooses her probability of attending college t 2 [0; 1], taking as given the
proportion of college graduates in her generation t 2 (0; 1), market wages and
public policies such that to be indi¤erent between the two choices. Consequently,
the equilibrium t 2 [0; 1] is given by the following indi¤erence condition:
t =
8<:
0 ; (1  n2)w2t+1h2t < w1t+1h1t
2 (0; 1) ; (1  n2)w2t+1h2t = w1t+1h1t
1 ; (1  n2)w2t+1h2t > w1t+1h1t
; (1)
where w1t+1 and w2t+1 are the next period unskilled and skilled wage per e¢ ciency
unit, h1t and h2t the human capital accumulated in the rst and second stage, re-
spectively. Since there is no uncertainty in college completion, we use the terms
enrollment and attainment interchangeably.
The human capital in the rst stage of education is produced using both privately
and publicly provided inputs. The economic literature concerned with educational
spending has used various specications: Kaganovich and Zilcha (1999) use a Cobb-
Douglas specication, implying an input elasticity of substitution equal to one. In
Blankenau (2005), public and private inputs are complements in the human capital
production function at the rst stage and perfect substitutes in the production of
tertiary education. Glomm and Kaganovich (2003) use an additive specication to
model the relationship between education provision and social security.
Since the focus of this paper is on the interaction between public and private
spending, we do not consider other factors that play a role in human capital produc-
tion, such as the stock of human capital accumulated by the previous generation or
parental time. However, including these factors does not alter the main conclusions
of the paper. The human capital acquired in the rst stage by a young agent at time
t is given by the following production function:
h1t = B1
h
 e
 1
1t + (1  ) b 11t
i  1
1 ; (2)
where e1t and b1t are the public and private inputs per student, 1 2 [ 1;+1);
0 <  < 1 and B1 > 0.
The human capital of a college educated agent is then produced according to:
h2t = B2h

1t [e
 2
2t + b
 2
2t ]
  1 
2 ; (3)
8
where where e2t and b2t are the public and private inputs per student, 2 2 [ 1;+1);
0 <  < 1 and B2 > 0. The human capital accumulated in the rst stage (h1t) is
an essential input in the production of tertiary education, by the very nature of the
educational process. We explore the strength of this complementarity in Appendix C
by extending the production function in (3) to a CES specication. The coe¢ cient
 shows how important knowledge acquired during K-12 studies is for success in
tertiary education. If 2 =  1; public and private inputs are perfect substitutes. In
line with the discussion in the introduction, we expect private and public inputs to
be better (potentially perfect) substitutes in tertiary education compared to earlier
stages of education.
Assumption 1.  1 6 2 6 1:
Notice that for 1; 2 2 [ 1; 0); public inputs are not essential in the production
of human capital.
To keep the model tractable, we abstract from the interaction between the child
and parent in nancing the cost of college, by assuming all private inputs are provided
by parents.
In order to analytically derive the main results and policy implications of the
model, we rst focus on particular cases of human capital production functions. We
initially assume a Cobb-Douglas education production function instead of the more
general CES form. This implies 1 = 0 and
h1t = B1e

1tb
1 
1t (4)
This specication has been frequently used in the literature studying human capital
accumulation (see for example Blankenau (2005), Su (2004)). Furthermore, for the
higher education production function, we rst assume perfect elasticity of substitu-
tion, or 2 =  1: Thus, similarly to Glomm and Kaganovich (2003), we have:
h2t = B2h

1t [e2t + b2t]
1 ; (5)
We use this special case as a starting point in order to illustrate the mechanisms
at work in the model. We relax the assumption of 1 = 0 and 2 =  1 in Section 5.
2.1.2 Parents educational spending decisions
The parents allocate a portion of their income to educational transfers. The overall
amount of parental resources spent on education depends on income and stems from
an altruistic motive. Ex-ante, each o¤spring decides to attend college with proba-
bility t: Given perfect foresight, this corresponds to an ex-post measure t = t
of college educated individuals in the economy. Parents will allocate the transfers
across the two stages in order to maximize the expected utility derived from the
human capital accumulated by their children.
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Denote the share of households disposable income allocated for educational pur-
poses t and the fraction dedicated to K-12 education as  t. Then the amount spent
at each stage is given by:
x1t =  ttYt(1  ); (6)
x2t = (1   t)tYt(1  ): (7)
where  is the constant income tax rate.
Formally, the parents problem is
max
fct;b1t;b2tg
U = ln ct +  [(1  t) lnh1t + t lnh2t] s:t: (8)
ct + x1t + x2t = (1  )wtht 1,
(4), (5), (6) and (7)
given  ; t; e1t; e2t
where ct represents parents consumption, wt is the wage per e¢ ciency unit at
time t and ht 1 the parental human capital accumulated in the previous period. The
wage income is taxed at a constant rate  . The parameter   0 captures the utility
weight the parent attaches to childs human capital. Recall that agents have the same
life time income after the educational choice is made, as given by the indi¤erence
condition (1).
The private investment in basic education is certain and it enters the utility
function directly through h1t (with probability 1  t) and through h2t which is also
a function of h1t (with probability t). Therefore, the private input per student in
the production technology of basic education b1t is equal to x1t:
On the other side, the private investment in higher education is the price of a
lottery6 that earns the child a college degree with probability t. Ex-post, private
investment per capita among the measure t of successful college candidates is:
b2t =
x2t
t
(9)
The parent needs to choose jointly the level of education spending as a fraction
of disposable income (t) and the fraction of resources devoted to each educational
6The view of higher education as a lottery is motivated by considerable college drop-out rates.
The OECD average survival rate in tertiary education was 70% in 2004 (OECD (2006)). It varies
between 53% in Mexico and 91% in Japan.
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stage ( t; 1   t). We use the budget constraint, (6) and (7) to rewrite the parents
problem at time t:
max
ft; tg
U = ln [(1  )(1 t)wtht 1] + (10)
 [(1  t) lnh1t(t;  t) + t lnh2t(t;  t)]
s:t: (4) and (5)
Taking the rst order conditions with respect to (t;  t) yields the following
expressions:
(t) :
 1
1 t + 

(1  t) 1
h1t
@h1t
@t
+ t
1
h2t
@h2t
@t

6 0, = 0 if t 2 (0; 1)
( t) : (1  t)
1
h1t
@h1t
@ t
+ t
1
h2t
@h2t
@ t
R 0, (11)
= 0 if  t 2 (0; 1); < 0 if  t = 0; > 0 if  t = 1
2.2 Production sector
A representative rm uses the two types of human capital to produce the nal output:
Yt = A (H
 
1t 1 + (1  )H 2t 1) 
1
 (12)
where A is the total factor productivity,  2 [ 1;1) and 0 <  < 1. In order to
derive analytical results we rst specialize production to the Cobb-Douglas functional
form
Yt = AH

1t 1H
1 
2t 1
while in the later sections we present the general model using the CES specica-
tion. The assumption has nontrivial implications for the size of enrollment in higher
education as we shall see in the Section 5.
The aggregate supplies of unskilled and skilled labor are given by the following
expressions:
H1t 1 = (1  t 1)h1t 1; (13)
H2t 1 = (1  n2)t 1h2t 1: (14)
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2.3 Government
The government taxes income at a constant rate  and uses a fraction of the tax
revenues to provide public inputs in both stages of the education process. Denote
the share of income that goes to public education as g; g <  7. The education budget
is balanced so that
g Yt = Et = e1t +t e2t: (15)
Denote by t the fraction of the total public spending devoted to K-12 level.
Consequently, the per capita allocations for K-12 and tertiary education are given
by the following expressions:
e1t = t Et = t g Yt , (16)
e2t =
1  t
t
Et =
1  t
t
g Yt: (17)
3 Equilibrium analysis
We rst dene a competitive equilibrium in an economy where policies f ; g; tg are
exogenous.
Denition 1. An equilibrium with exogenous public policies is dened as a triplet
ft;t;  tg such that,at the beginning of each time period t :
1. The young agent chooses the probability to attend college t such that to satisfy
(1), given the aggregate measure of college educated agents t, wages w1t and w2t;
parental allocations b1t; b2t and governmental outlays e1t; e2t for education across the
two stages;
2. Individual and aggregate decisions are consistent in equilibrium: t = t;
3. Given the wages, t, t, and the government policies, the allocations ft;  tg
solve the parents problem (8);
4. The rms pay competitive market wages;
5. The educational public budget is balanced.
3.1 Optimal enrollment
To nd the equilibrium enrollment t, we use (1). The production function satises
the Inada condition with respect to both inputs. This guarantees that in equilibrium
7Given the paper focuses on analyzing the interaction between private and public provision of
education, we do not model the usage of the remaining revenues,    g: This share can be thought
of as a waste or unproductive government consumption.
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t is strictly between zero and one. A corner solution of zero (one) would drive the
wage for skilled (unskilled) labor to positive innity, which in turn would make the
choice for t unsustainable. The equilibrium probability to attend college is derived
from the indi¤erence condition:
(1  n2)w2t+1h2t = w1t+1h1t: (18)
Plugging in the competitive wages
w1t+1 = 
Yt+1
H1t
; w2t+1 = (1  )Yt+1
H2t
;
and using the supply denitions (13) and (14), (18) yields a constant enrollment
t =  = 1  ; 8t > 0: (19)
Consequently, the fraction of skilled people equals the fraction of the skilled
labor wage bill in total income. The constant enrollment is a feature derived from
the Cobb-Douglas assumption on the output production. We show in Section 5 that
in the general case of CES production, enrollment is a function of the relative stocks
of skilled and unskilled labor and therefore varies with both the policy variables and
households allocations.
3.2 The balanced growth path
We look for a balanced growth path equilibrium, where the output and both types
of human capital grow at a common, constant rate gy and the shares ft;  t; tg are
constant.
Plugging the expressions for e1t; e2t; b1t and b2t into (2) and (5) and using the fact
that agents are homogenous within the skill group (i.e. h1t and h2t are the same for
all agents), we get the following expressions for human capital accumulated in the
rst and second stage, respectively:
h1t = B1(g)
[ (1  )]1 Yt (20)
h2t = B2

(g)[ (1  )]1 	 1
1 
 (21)
[(1  )g + (1   )(1  )]1  Yt
Combining (12), (13), (14) and using t 1 = t, we get
Yt = A(1  )[(1  n2)]1 h1t 1h1 2t 1; (22)
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Using (20) and (21) in (12) we get the growth rate of the economy:
gy =
Yt
Yt 1
= C

(g)[ (1  )]1 	+(1 ) 
[(1  )g + (1   )(1  )](1 )(1 ) ;
where C = AB1B
1 
2 (1  )(1 )(1  n2)1 :
3.3 Equilibrium spending allocations
We solve for household decisions as functions of public policy parameters on the bal-
ance growth path, so that t =  and  t =  : Proposition 1 provides the condition
under which an interior solution for the fraction of the households education budget
allocated to K-12 education  exists. All proofs are in the Appendix.A
Proposition 1. There exists a threshold e = (1  )[1  (1  )](1  )g
(1  )(1  ) such
that  =
(1  )[1  (1  )]
1  [1  (1  )]

(1  )g
(1  ) + 1

2 (0; 1) if  > e and  = 1
otherwise.
In other words, households tend to invest privately in higher education only if
they spend a high fraction of their income on education overall. They are more
likely to do so if they have a larger disposable income ( lower), or the total public
spending in education g and the fraction of it devoted to higher education (1   )
are su¢ ciently low. Also, the more important the private input is in the human
capital production in the rst stage (i.e. the greater the parameter 1  ), the lower
the likelihood of private investment in the second stage. The opposite holds for the
elasticity of spending per student (1  ) in the production of human capital in the
advanced stage.
The fraction of private resources allocated to the advanced education stage is
increasing in the total amount of private contributions. This is an important inter-
mediate result since it highlights the fact that all factors (including policy variables)
that make the households richer will generate higher private spending in tertiary
education.
Proposition 2.  >
g(1  )
(1  )(1  )  g(1  )(1  )[1  (1  )] is a su¢ cient
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and necessary condition for  2 (0; 1). Then,
t =  =
(1  ) f1  [1  (1  )]g   g(1  )
(1  ) f1 +  f1  [1  (1  )]gg and (23)
 t =  =
(1  )[1  (1  )] [1   + g(1  )]
(1  ) f1  [1  (1  )]g   g(1  ) : (24)
Otherwise,
t =
(1  ) [1  (1  )]
1  (1  ) [1  (1  )] and  t = 1:
Since public inputs enter the production of human capital in both stages, pri-
vate resources are not essential, so the households will allocate private resources
for tertiary education only if the altruism coe¢ cient is strong enough, as suggested
above.
Assuming interior solutions for  and  ; we perform the following policy experi-
ments: we change the generosity of total public spending on education g, the public
spending mix  and the tax rate  in order to analyze their e¤ects on both  and  :
4 Policy experiments
In this section, we briey describe the main analytical results of the model for the case
1 = 0; 2 =  1 and Cobb-Douglas production function ( = 0). In the following
sections, we develop the analysis and the policy implications in a more general setup
that is calibrated and solved numerically.
Proposition 3. (A change in the generosity of public spending g) Assume ,  2
(0; 1) and a xed  2 (0; 1). Then @
@g
< 0 and
@ 
@g
> 0:
An increase in the total public budget for education (g) has a negative e¤ect
on the overall level of private spending on education. It also leads to a higher
fraction of total private spending allocated to the rst educational stage. Given
a xed fraction  of public resources allocated to K-12 stage, a higher budget g
implies more public spending in both stages. The complementarity from the rst
stage between private and public resources is dominated by the substitution e¤ect
in the second stage. Since the overall level of human capital increases with g, its
marginal utility decreases, hence  goes down.
The second result indicates that at a given level of educational private spending
, the share allocated to rst stage education increases with g since higher public
inputs boost the productivity of private inputs in K-12 but not in tertiary education.
Thus agents substitute towards the more productive use of their resources.
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Proposition 4. A change in the public spending mix (). Assume ,  2 (0; 1)
and a xed g 2 (0; 1). Then @
@
> 0 and
@ 
@
< 0:
Assuming the level of public funding for education is xed, a higher share of K-
12 public funding generates an increase in total private spending in education and
hence higher private contributions at both stages. Secondly, an increase in public
K-12 spending prompts households to allocate a larger share of their investments
towards higher education.
Propositions 3 and 4 are particularly important. Households respond to both the
size (g) and the composition () of public education budget. In the context of policy
making, governments have two alternative ways to expand higher education provision
given a xed level of public resources g. First, they could directly decrease  or on
the contrary, increase their participation in the basic stages and let households use
more of their resources in the advanced stage. We expand on the policy implications
in the next sections. Moreover, chanelling more resources towards the basic stage
has the interesting e¤ect of increasing the overall education spending in the economy
as it boosts the private investment in human capital.
Complementarity between public and private inputs in K-12 education is instru-
mental in obtaining this result. A higher share of K-12 public inputs produces two
e¤ects on  . Since  goes up, 1    must go down, which implies that less public
inputs are available in the second stage, since the size of the public budget g is xed.
Households will compensate this decrease by decreasing  . This is the direct e¤ect.
Second, an increase in  raises the marginal productivity of private resources in the
rst stage. This would prompt an increase in the total private spending  which
in turn leads to a decrease in  . It can be seen that the e¤ects on  reinforce each
other, such that in equilibrium  will decrease.
However, private investment in education depends on many other factors. In
particular, notice that  also depends on the general tax level,  , so di¤erences in
taxation undoubtedly explain why private contributions vary a lot across economies.
Thus, it is useful to establish the following results.
Proposition 5. A change in the income tax rate (). Assume ,  2 (0; 1). Then
for given ; g 2 (0; 1), @
@
< 0 and
@ 
@
> 0:
Higher tax rates lead to a lower disposable income and consequently diminish
the private incentives to invest in education at all stages. Interestingly, in the same
time, higher taxes produce a reallocation of private resources towards the rst stage,
where scarcer private resources yield higher human capital and hence higher utility.
Section 7 expands on this aspect.
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5 The general model
The case 1 = 0 and 2 =  1 was considered for analytical tractability. However, a
more general analysis seems to be warranted given the scant and ultimately inconclu-
sive empirical evidence on the estimates of such elasticities for education production
functions. While the education literature reviewed above does not imply any partic-
ular values for 1 and 2; it does suggest that the elasticity of substitution between
private and public inputs is higher in the rst stage compared to the second. In
a somewhat related exercise, Clotfelter (1977) analyzes the role of substitution be-
tween private and public inputs in the production of law and order. He estimates a
production function of security that is CES in private and public inputs. He nds
an elasticity of 2:47, while perfect substitution would imply a value of plus innity.
This illustrates the fact that in reality, public and private inputs are often quite far
from being perfect substitutes.
In the following, we relax the assumptions on the functional form of human capital
production in both stages. We also allow the nal good production to combine skilled
and unskilled labor at a constant elasticity of substitution:
Yt = A (H
 
1t 1 + (1  )H 2t 1) 
1
 (25)
This assumption extends the model in an important way. While the Cobb-Doublas
form implied a constant enrollment  = 1  ; the CES form will generate a policy
dependent enrollment. Since the general setup does not yield analytical results, we
calibrate the model and solve it numerically.
With the CES specication, market wages are given by:
w1t =
Yt
H1t 1
H 1t 1
H 1t 1 + (1  )H 2t 1
; and (26)
w2t =
Yt
H2t 1
(1  )H 2t 1
H 1t 1 + (1  )H 2t 1
: (27)
Substituting the labor market clearing conditions (13) and (14) we obtain that
enrollment is given by
1  t
t
=


1  
 1
1+

(1  n2)h2t 1
h1t 1
 
1+
: (28)
Further, on a balanced growth path, we can use the equilibrium solutions for the
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human capital in the two stages
h1t 1 = B1Yt

 (g) 1 + (1  ) ( (1  )) 1  11 ; and
h2t 1 = B2h1t 1Y
1 
t
"
(1  ) g
t
 2
+

(1   ) (1  )
t
 2#  1 2
to substitute into (28). To do this, it is useful to rewrite
h2t 1
h1t 1
=  1t B2B
 1
1

 (g) 1 + (1  ) ( (1  )) 1   11 
((1  ) g) 2 + ((1   ) (1  )) 2  1 2
Upon substitution (28) becomes independent of the output level. Therefore, on a
balanced growth path, the enrollment level is constant and given by the solution of
the following nonlinear equation

1 (1 )
1+ = 1  ; (29)
where  =


1 
 1
1+
 
(1  n2)B2B 11

 (g) 1 + (1  ) ( (1  )) 1 1 1 
((1  ) g) 2 + ((1   ) (1  )) 2  1 2
! 
1+
:
It is easy to check that equation (29) has a unique positive solution  2 (0; 1): To
further explore the predictions of the generalized setup, we parametrize the model
as follows.
In the model a period is approximately 30 years, so n2 = 0:13matches the average
duration of tertiary education of about 4 years. We set the public spending share
in GDP, g and the K-12 share of public spending, , at the 2003 OECD average of
5:54% and 76% respectively. Similarly,  is set to 36%, the average total tax receipts
as a percentage of GDP in OECD.
We choose the total factor productivity A to obtain an annual growth rate of
approximately 2%. This corresponds to a per period growth factor of 1:8: B1 is
normalized to one and B2 is set such that human capital of the college educated
remains higher than that of high-school educated even when all public funds are
used in K-12.
We choose  =  0:35 to yield an elasticity of substitution between skilled and
unskilled labor of 1.548. The output share of unskilled labor,  is set to 0.659.
8Caucutt and Kumar (2003) use a similar value. Krusell et al. (2000) estimate an elasticity of
about 1.6 in a CES production function with physical capital.
9Estimates for the share of unskilled labor used in the literature vary from 0.8 (Blankenau et al.
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We assume equal productivity for the public and private spending in the rst
stage, which implies  = 0:5: The weight of K-12 education in the production of
tertiary education  is xed at 0:2. This low weight reects the fact that while
knowledge acquired during K-12 studies serves as foundation for later education, it
is nonetheless basic and not often used as such by skilled workers. For example,
engineers rarely use Pythagoras theorem. We perform a sensitivity analysis for this
parameter in Appendix B .
Given the above parameters for the public policies, we set 2, 1 and , the
altruism parameter, to obtain values for  (share of private spending in disposable
income);  (K-12 share of private spending); and  (higher education enrollment)
that are consistent with data on education nance and attainment in the OECD
countries.
However, private investment in human capital, especially in the rst stage is
di¢ cult to measure (e.g.: nutrition, health-care, "within the family education") and
therefore more likely to be under-reported. Keeping this in mind, we interpret the
observed values of the private spending, , and the private K-12 share,  ; as lower
bounds for our calibration. The same argument applies for the college attainment.
In this paper we do not allow for uncertainty in college completion (see Restuccia
and Urrutia (2004), Caucutt and Kumar (2003)). Therefore, the enrollment rate 
is equal to the attainment rate, dened as the share of college educated people in
the labor force.
Thus,  = 0:06, 1 =  0:4 and 2 =  0:8 yield a private spending share in
GDP


1  

of 1:17%; a K-12 share in the private spending ( ) of 85:3% and an
attainment rate () of 34:62%: The value of

1   for the OECD countries varies
between 0:13% (Turkey) to 3:01% (Korea), with an OECD average share of 0:94%:
The observed OECD averages for  and  are 52:3% and 25% respectively. Appendix
B gives a summary of the calibration and a sensitivity analysis for 1 and 2.
Figure 1 describes the changes in the variables of interest when public policies
are varied exogenously.
We begin by analyzing the e¤ects of  on household decisions and aggregate
outcomes. The graphs in the top row of Figure 1 show the households allocations
;  and  and the growth rate of the economy gY for  2 [25; 100] and g xed at
the OECD average.
Public resources substitution from tertiary toward K-12 education is facilitated
by the di¤erent per capita e¤ects of these resources. At the advanced stage, a given
amount of public resources has a higher productivity than in the rst stage since
only a measure  < 1 of people attend college. As stated in Proposition 4, a
(2007)) to 0.5 (Caucutt and Kumar (2003)).
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Figure 1: Exogeneous policies in the benchmark model. First row: g = 5:54%;
Second row:  = 76%:
higher share of public resources allocated to K-12 education induces two households
reactions. First, they provide more private educational inputs, which results in a
higher overall share of educational investment in disposable income (higher ), and
hence more human capital of both types. This has a positive e¤ect on growth rate.
Second, they allocate a higher share of the increased education budget on advanced
education. However, shifting public resources towards basic education lowers the
quality of tertiary education and therefore has a negative e¤ect on attainment in the
advanced education stage.
While dynamic complementarity between early and late investment in human
capital has been analyzed in the literature (Cunha and Heckman (2007), Restuccia
and Urrutia (2004)), here we analyze a double complementarity: in timing and in
the source of spending. The last interaction, between private and public resources,
highlights an additional role for education policy: to stimulate and direct the private
spending across education stages. As less public funding is available for tertiary
education (since the size of the budget is xed), its quality decreases, since households
do not fully replace this spending. The partial crowding-in decreases the enrollment
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and ends up hurting the growth rate of the economy. Interestingly, the growth
maximizing share of public K-12 spending is around 80%, close to the observed
values for the OECD countries.
Summing up, the analysis yields two main conclusions: (1) an increased share of
public funds in the rst stage will have a non-monotonic e¤ect on the growth rate
but (2) will also decrease the share of skilled people in the economy. In other words,
we nd that focusing on higher education may pay o¤ in terms of growth when the
amount allocated to higher education is low. Budgeting even more funds to the
second stage will increase indeed college attainment but at the expense of economic
growth. These conclusions are particularly relevant in light of recent e¤orts to expand
higher education in both developed and developing countries as a way to support a
knowledge-based economy and ultimately to maintain steady growth rates.
We now move on to analyze the e¤ects of changing the budget size. In the graphs
in the second row of Figure 1,  = 76% while the educational public budget g varies
between 3% and 10% of GDP. The OECD countries invest between 3:5% (Greece)
and 8% (Denmark) of GDP in education. The results stated in Proposition 3 hold.
Households reduce their education budget and in the same time direct a higher share
of this budget toward K-12 education. However, as more public resources ow into
both stages, human capital of skilled and unskilled workers keeps increasing and so
does the growth rate. In our model the education budget g is always lower then the
tax rate  . Thus, on the relevant ranges for g and  ; the economy is on the upward
sloping side of the La¤er curve - where an increase in g increases the growth rate.
While more public funding increases both types of human capital, resources are
more e¤ective in the advanced than in the basic education, since they are allocated
to a smaller student population. Therefore, human capital of college graduates in-
creases faster than that of the high-school graduates. Recall that skilled and unskilled
workers are rather good substitutes, so the relative increase in college type human
capital triggers a decrease in their relative wage and also in enrollment. At even
higher education budgets, the increase in human capital dominates the decrease in
the wage, so the enrollment goes up.
Somewhat complementary to the previous results, we can now state that, keeping
the allocation of the budget xed (1) bigger public spending for education generates
higher growth rates but (2) not necessarily higher enrollment in tertiary education.
Up so far we have considered separately the e¤ects of changing the structure
and the size of the public budget for education. Tertiary education enrollment and
output growth are high priority policy objectives and often the former is seen as a
precondition for the latter. Our model helps to explain when this may or may not
be the case. On the other side, if we assume that governments can use both the
size and the structure of the education budget as policy tools, the analysis above
shows that maximum growth and enrollment can be attained. However, political
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economy considerations (such as electoral concerns or a higher degree of unionization
in primary and secondary education sector) can imply di¤erent abilities to control
these instruments. In the next section, we focus on a subset of policy targets and
instruments, by assuming governments set the K-12 share of public spending such
that to maximize the output growth rate.
6 Growth maximizing policies
Recall that due to constant returns in the production of output and human capital,
in equilibrium, the model generates balanced growth in output, denoted by gy. We
assume the governments objective is to maximize the steady-state growth rate of
output by choosing the fraction of educational resources invested in K-12 education
, given the general tax level  and the size of the overall education budget g10.
Thus, the government takes into account the reaction function of households to
public policies (; g),  (; g) and (; g) when it chooses , while households take
the public educational policies as given. Formally, the government problem is stated
as follows:
max
fg
gy(; g) s:t: (30)
g Yt = Et = e1t +t e2t (31)
given  ; g;  (; g);(; g);
where  (; g) and (; g) solve (8) and (; g) =  (32)
We solve for the optimal  numerically using the parametrization described in
the previous section.
Figure 2 shows the growth-maximizing  and the corresponding householdsde-
cisions,  and ; as well as the growth rate of the economy gY and the enrollment
:
As previously discussed, public spending is more productive in tertiary education
than it is in K-12, due to the "per capita" e¤ect. An extra dollar spent in tertiary
education applies to a measure  < 1 students rather than the entire population (of
measure 1) if spent on K-12 education. Thus, everything else constant, at low levels
10It makes sense to consider g as xed, since on the relevant range, higher g always implies a
higher growth rate. Moreover, the size of the public budget allocated to education reects political
preferences that are quasi xed for a specic country and depend on many factors among which
the degree of unionization in education, the size of private education sector, level of development
etc. In the same spirit, the general tax level can be considered the result of a political process, not
modelled here.
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Figure 2: Growth maximizing structure of the public spending.
of the education public budget, it is optimal to allocate a higher share of funds to
the rst educational stage where resources have a higher marginal productivity. This
result is in line with the results in Blankenau (2005) who nds in a di¤erent model
that government nances tertiary education only when the total public spending on
education (g) exceeds a certain threshold and then, its share increases with the size
of the budget. However, given that public education budgets are generally lower
than 10% of GDP, the growth maximizing K-12 fraction declines slowly and stays
above 70%. This is consistent with the shares observed in the data that range from
58% to 77%. The intuition for the high-share of public spending allocated to K-12
relies on the crowding out e¤ect that an increase in g has on private education con-
tributions. At lower levels of ; households rebalance their allocation of educational
inputs towards primary education (higher  ). In turn, this makes public resources
more productive in the rst stage, hence the high level of : This complementar-
ity ultimately reduces the marginal productivity of public resources so that further
increasing the budget size is accompanied by a lower share of K-12 spending.
Enrollment follows a non-monotonic pattern as public spending increases, simi-
lar to that described in the case of exogenous policies. First, the relative wage of
the college educated grows faster than their relative human capital, due to the high
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elasticity of substitution in the production of nal goods, causing a drop in enroll-
ment rates. When g exceeds a threshold (around 4%) the increase in human capital
dominates the decrease in skilled wages so the share of college educated starts going
up. This is a general equilibrium e¤ect, partially due to the simple structure of the
model that, for example, does not account for skilled-biased technological progress
or di¤erences in abilities across agents.
Our analysis of growth-maximizing education policy suggests that (1) as coun-
tries invest more public resources in education, an increasing share should go toward
advanced training. (2) Nonetheless, for total budgets under 10% of GDP, the K-12
stage should still receive the bulk of the public funds. Moreover, increased funding
will generate a higher enrollment only after a critical size budget has been reached,
despite the expanding support for higher education.
Our conclusions are broadly consistent with the observed composition of the
educational public budgets in developed economies. However, there are important
di¤erences among the institutions and the organization of education across countries.
The tax level is one of the main factors that has signicant e¤ects on the private
incentives to invest in education, both in terms of amount invested and allocation
across stages. In all the previous experiments, the tax rate was assumed to be xed.
We look at the e¤ect of tax di¤erences in the next section.
7 Tax level e¤ects
Higher taxes diminish the disposable income and hence the overall resources directed
to education. Moreover, higher tax levels do not necessarily imply higher public
education spending as a fraction of total tax receipts. Average public education
spending in the EU is somewhat lower than in the US despite a higher tax level. On
the other side, Northern European countries have higher taxes than the European
average but also higher public spending on education. We explore the predictions
of this model regarding the optimal public policy at di¤erent tax levels, assuming
education spending g is independent of the tax level  :
In Figure 3 we compute the growth maximizing share of public K-12 spending
for  = f0:25; 0:4g. The two values reect the general taxation level in US and EU,
expressed as percentage of tax receipts in GDP. As one might expect, Figure 3 shows
that higher taxes imply lower growth rates and lower overall private spending, at
all levels of public spending g. It is however interesting to discuss the optimal K-12
shares in public and respectively private spending ( and  ). The optimal fraction
of public budget allocated to higher education (1   ) is higher in economies with
higher taxes. This happens because households incentives to invest in education
respond to the tax level in two ways. First, they decrease their total spending by
way of an income e¤ect. Second, they spend more on K-12 education, since, as we
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Figure 3: Growth maximizing structure of the public spending for di¤erent tax levels.
have shown in the previous sections, the returns to rst stage spending are higher
when  is low, which is the case here at all levels of g, due to the higher taxes.
The models predictions for the private allocations t well the data for OECD
countries. EU countries spend less on education privately and tend to have a higher
fraction of private resources spent on K-12 education compared to the United States
or Canada. While households allocations seem to behave as suggested by our model,
not the same thing can be said about public policy. Growth maximizing policies im-
ply that high tax countries should focus more of their public budget on tertiary edu-
cation to compensate for the withdrawal of private funds while the low tax countries
should strengthen public support for primary and secondary education, as households
have more incentives to invest in higher education.
However Table 1 shows that EU and US have allocated their education budgets in
a very similar manner, despite the signicant di¤erences in taxation. United States
even allocates a slightly higher share of public funds towards K-12.
In relative terms, this departure from the growth-maximizing policies indicated
by the model, suggests that US could grow faster by increasing the public support
to K-12 education and/or EU should improve its higher education to achieve higher
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growth. These implications mirror closely recent education policies, such as the No
Child Left Behind Program in the US that aims at improving educational outcomes
at early stages or the comprehensive Lisbon strategy in Europe that emphasizes
investments in higher education and R&D.
The bias toward higher education spending explains why a high tax country can
achieve higher tertiary education attainment rates if the overall budget is su¢ ciently
large. A good example in this respect are the Scandinavian countries.
They spend on average 7:3% of GDP on education while the average EU11 budget
is 5:27%. EU uses an average of 24:1% of the education budget to fund tertiary educa-
tion. The same indicator is 32% for Finland, 31:4% for Norway, 29% for Sweden and
31% for Denmark. On the other side, average tertiary education attainment in these
countries is 33:2%, compared to the EU average of 22:9%. Moreover, during the last
decade, Scandinavian countries have outpaced the average annual growth in EU19
by 0:30%. While this is due to a variety of reasons, among which steady deregulation
and labor market reforms, high productivity growth is also linked to a well-educated
work force that allowed these states to maintain a comparative advantage in knowl-
edge intensive sectors, mainly information and communication technologies12.
Despite the size of the educated labor force, at equal education budgets, the high
tax country has a lower growth rate since private spending is discouraged, which
reduces the quality of education at both stages. However, larger education budgets
produce higher growth. The latter factor seems to dominate the tax e¤ect in the
case of Scandinavian countries.
In our model, we exclude di¤erences in ability hence individual reactions to tax-
ation coming through reduced skill premium. This is why, for example, low tax
countries, such as US and Canada have higher attainment rates than the OECD
average. Lower skill premium is likely to diminish if not to o¤set the increased en-
rollment in the high tax country that is due mainly to increased public spending in
tertiary education as a share in total budget. However, we capture a similar, albeit
indirect, e¤ect of taxation on education, through the parentsconcern for the human
capital of their children. This is an important link, in that it determines how the
public policy will attempt to maximize growth, given the tax level.
8 Conclusion
Improving education quality gures high on political agendas everywhere. In particu-
lar, higher education competitiveness has been receiving a lot of attention during last
decade. While more public funding is often touted as a panacea, the (dis)incentives
for private investment should be given careful consideration. In this paper we study
11Here, EU refers to the 19 EU countries that are also OECD members.
12The EEAG Report on the European Economy 2007.
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the channels through which public spending triggers private responses in education
funding.
The great diversity in how education is organized across countries, mainly with
respect to the source of spending and the ownership of institutions, makes a general
analysis di¢ cult. We have tried to encompass the institutional variety by postulating
very general production functions for human capital, in order to focus on the interac-
tion between private and public education nance. We study this issue in a two-stage
education framework where parents optimally choose the total resources to be spent
on education and their allocation across stages. While the rst stage is compulsory,
young agents take the parental and the public inputs as given and decide whether to
enroll in the second stage. The elasticity of substitution between private and public
inputs at each stage is crucial for the analysis. While little is known on the degree
of substitutability/complementarity between private and public inputs in K-12 ver-
sus tertiary education, our analysis shows that under very general conditions, the
allocation of public inputs across education stages can be growth-improving if the
householdsresponse to policies is taken into account.
We derive the main results of the paper analytically for the particular case when
private and public inputs are unit elastic substitutes in the rst stage and perfect
substitutes in the production of human capital in the second stage and study the
e¤ects of changing both the level of the education budget and its structure on house-
holdseducation spending. Then, we generalize to the case where both stages display
an elasticity of substitution higher than one.
First, we nd that overall public spending crowds out private contributions in
general, but increases the share of private spending on K-12 education. Conversely,
assuming a xed budget, a higher share of K-12 public funding generates higher
private contributions at both stages and also an increase in private spending for
tertiary education. As a result, the overall amount of resources used for education
in the entire economy goes up. We also show that increasing enrollment in tertiary
education may conict with the objective of higher economic growth. Moreover,
increasing the public budget for education has non-monotonic e¤ects on enrollment.
Second, we look at growth-maximizing policies. Our results suggest that the opti-
mal share of public spending devoted to K-12 decreases with the total public budget
for education but remains high (over 70%) irrespective of its size. We also nd that
countries with a high tax level will optimally direct a relatively higher fraction of
public resources toward tertiary education while the households respond by focusing
their spending on the rst stage. If public education spending is high enough, higher
taxes can generate higher enrollment if the country is pursuing growth maximizing
policies. Our model is broadly consistent with observed private and public spending
for OECD countries. Moreover, ranking data for US and EU against model pre-
dictions, we provide evidence that increasing public spending at the K-12 stage in
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the US and at the tertiary level in the EU are consistent with a growth-maximizing
policy.
Education policies are very concerned with inequality and access to schooling.
We do not explicitly address this issue here. An extended analysis using a heteroge-
nous agent framework would allow for a more detailed description of the interaction
between stages (by incorporating an admission threshold at the later stage) or type
of public spending (means-tested aid, merit-based subsidies). Such a framework
would also make possible a welfare comparison of the various funding schemes. In-
corporating heterogeneity in ability would imply a more important role of the skill
premium, which has important implications on the way public policy a¤ects individ-
ualsdecisions and technological progress shapes education nance at all stages. We
leave all these extensions for future research.
References
Aghion, P., Boustan, L., Hoxby, C. and Vandenbussche, J.: 2005, Exploiting States
Mistakes to Identify the Causal Impact of Higher Education on Growth, NBER
Working Paper .
Barro, R. J.: 2001, Human Capital and Growth, American Economic Review
91(2), 1217.
Bearse, P., Glomm, G. and Patterson, D. M.: 2005, Endogenous Public Expenditures
on Education, Journal of Public Economic Theory 7(4), 561577.
Blankenau, W.: 2005, Public schooling, college subsidies and growth, Journal of
Economic Dynamics and Control (29), 487507.
Blankenau, W., Cassou, S. and Ingram, B.: 2007, Allocating Government Education
Expenditures Across K-12 and College Education, Economic Theory 31(1), 85
112.
Brauninger, M. and Vidal, J. P.: 2000, Private versus public nancing of education
and endogenous growth , Journal of Population Economics 13(3), 387 401.
Cardak, B. A. and Givon, D.: 2004, Why the Poor Dont go to University: Attain-
ment Constraints and Two-Staged Education, La Trobe University .
Carneiro, P. and Heckman, J. J.: 2003, Human Capital Policy, in B. M. Friedman
(ed.), Inequality in America: What Role for Human Capital Policy?, MIT Press,
Cambridge, MA.
28
Cassou, S. P. and Lansing, K. J.: 2003, Tax Reform and Useful Public Expenditures,
Manuscript .
Caucutt, E. M. and Kumar, K. B.: 2003, Higher education subsidies and heterogene-
ity: a dynamic analysis, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 27(8), 1459
1502.
Clotfelter, C. T.: 1977, Public Services, Private Substitutes, and the Demand for
Protection against Crime, American Economic Review 67(5), 86777.
Cunha, F. and Heckman, J.: 2007, The Technology of Skill Formation, American
Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 97(2), 3147.
Driskill, R. A. and Horowitz, A. W.: 2002, Investment in Hierarchical Human Capi-
tal, Review of Development Economics 6(1), 4858.
Eckstein, Z. and Zilcha, I.: 1994, The e¤ects of compulsory schooling on growth,
income distribution and welfare, Journal of Public Economics (55), 339359.
Glomm, G. and Kaganovich, M.: 2003, Distributional E¤ects of Public Education
in an Economy with Public Pensions, International Economic Review 44(3), 803
1204.
Glomm, G. and Ravikumar, B.: 1992, Public versus private investment in human
capital: endogenous growth and income inequality, Journal of Political Economy
(4), 818834.
Glomm, G. and Ravikumar, B.: 1998, Flat-rate taxes, government spending on
education and growth, Review of Economic Dynamics (1), 306325.
Hanushek, E. A. and Kimko, D. D.: 2000, Schooling, Labor-Force Quality, and the
Growth of Nations, American Economic Review 90(5), 11841208.
Heckman, J. J. and Masterov, D. V.: 2007, The Productivity Argument for Investing
in Young Children, Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Heckman, J. J., R, L. and J, S.: 1999, The Economics and Econometrics of Ac-
tive Labor Market Programs, in O. A. Card and David (eds), Handbook of Labor
Economics, Vol. 3A, Elsevier, Amsterdam.
Houtenville, A. and Conway, K. S.: 2001, Parental e¤ect, school resources, and
student achievement, Manuscript, Cornell University .
Jacobs, B. and van der Ploeg, F.: 2005, Guide to Reform of Higher Education: A
European Perspective.
29
Jamison, E. A., Jamison, D. T. and Hanushek, E. A.: 2006, The E¤ects of Education
Quality on Income Growth and Mortality Decline, National Bureau of Economic
Research Working Paper Series No. 12652.
Kaganovich, M.: 2005, Education Reform and Access to Public Education in Russia,
Indiana University, mimeo .
Kaganovich, M. and Zilcha, I.: 1999, Education, social security and growth, Journal
of Public Economics (71), 289309.
Kim, H.-K.: 2001, Is there a crowding-out e¤ect between school expenditure and
mothers child care time? , Economics of Education Review 20, 7180.
Krueger, A. B. and Lindahl, M.: 2001, Education for growth: why and for whom?,
Journal of Economic Literature (39), 11011136.
Krusell, P., Ohanian, L. E., Rios-Rull, J.-V. and Violante, G. L.: 2000, Capital-
Skill Complementarity and Inequality: A Macroeconomic Analysis, Econometrica
68(5), 10291054.
LaLonde, R. J.: 1995, The Promise of Public Sector-Sponsored Training Programs,
Journal of Economic Perspectives 9(2), 14968.
Li, W.: 2005, Private Expenditures, Family Contributions, and Financial Aid in
Chinese Higher Education, Economics of Education Institute, Beijing University .
Lucas, R. E. J.: 1990, Supply-Side Economics: An Analytical Review, Oxford Eco-
nomic Papers 42(2), 293316.
Nordblom, K.: 2003, Is increased public schooling really a policy for equality? The
role of within-the-family education , Journal of Public Economics 87(9-10), 1943
1965.
OECD: 2006, Education at a Glance. OECD INDICATORS, Technical report.
Psacharopoulos, G. and Patrinos, H. A.: 2004, Returns to Investment in Education:
A Further Update, Education Economics 12(2).
Restuccia, D. and Urrutia, C.: 2004, Intergenerational Persistence of Earnings: The
Role of Early and College Education, American Economic Review 94(5), 1354
1378.
Romer, P. M.: 2000, Should the Government Subsidize Supply or Demand in the
Market for Scientists and Engineers?, NBER Working Paper No. 7723 .
30
Sapir, A., Aghion, P. and Bertola, G.: 2003, An agenda for a growing Europe. Making
the E.U. Economic System Deliver , Report of an Independent High-Level Study
Group established on the initiative of the President of the European Commission .
Stokey, N. L. and Rebelo, S.: 1995, Growth E¤ects of Flat-Rate Taxes, Journal of
Political Economy 103(3), 51950.
Su, X.: 2004, The allocation of public funds in a hierarchical educational system,
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (28), 24852510.
31
Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1. Consider a restricted optimization problem in which
the parent can only choose the allocation of resources across K-12 and tertiary edu-
cation, ( t), taking as given the total share of resources devoted to education (t).
Substituting (2) and (3) in (10), the parents problem can be written as follows:
max
 t
U = ln [Yt(1  )(1 t)] +  [1  (1  )] ln(g) + (1  ) [1  (1  )]
ln [ tt(1  )] + (1  ) ln[(1  )g +t(1   t)(1  )] +  lnYt
Denote the rst order condition f( t):
f( t) = (1  ) [1  (1  )]
1
 t
  (1  ) t(1  )
(1  )g +t(1   t)(1  )
R 0 with CS,
(33)
< 0 if  t = 0; > 0 if  t = 1
Since f( t) is a decreasing function of  t; f( t) = 0 has at most one solution. The
solution is in the interval (0; 1) if the following two conditions are satised:
lim
 t!0
f( t) > 0 (34)
lim
 t!1
f( t) < 0 (35)
We can see that the rst condition holds since lim
 t!0
f( t) = 1. The second
condition holds i¤:
(1  )[1  (1  )]  (1  )t(1  )
(1  )g < 0 (36)
Consequently, there exists a threshold e = (1  )[1  (1  )](1  )g
(1  )(1  ) such that
 t 2 (0; 1) if  > e and  = 1 otherwise. If  t is interior, it is the solution of
f( t) = 0. Using (33) we get:
 t =
(1  )[1  (1  )]
1  [1  (1  )]

(1  )g
t(1  ) + 1

(37)
Thus the proposition establishes that for each t < e; there exists a unique
 t =  (t) 2 (0; 1), dened by (37).
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Proof of Proposition 2. In this proposition we solve the parents problem in a
sequential fashion. First we consider another restricted problem in which the parent
can only choose the total share of resources devoted to education (t) taking as given
the allocation across stages ( t) and nd t = ( t). Then, in the second step, we
use  t =  (t) from Proposition 2 to solve for the equilibrium  t and t:
Step 1. Substituting (2) and (3) in (10), the parents problem can be written as
follows:
max
t
U = ln [Yt(1  )(1 t)] +  [1  (1  )] ln(g) + (1  ) [1  (1  )]
ln [ tt(1  )] + (1  ) ln[(1  )g +t(1   t)(1  )] +  lnYt
It can be easily checked that
lim
t!0
@U(t)
@t
=  1 (38)
lim
t!1
@U(t)
@t
= +1 (39)
Moreover, the function
@U(t)
@t
is decreasing in t. Together with (38) and (39)
this implies the parents restricted problem has a unique solution in the interval (0; 1):
Thus, the households problem yields a unique and interior solution t 2 (0; 1) for
all  t 2 [0; 1]:
Step 2. We consider two subcases:
a) Suppose t > e. The rst order condition with respect to t is:
  1
1 t +
(1  ) [1  (1  )]
t
+
(1  )(1   t)(1  )
(1  )g +t(1   t)(1  )
= 0 (40)
Using (37) in (40) and rearranging we obtain the following solutions for t and  t:
t =  =
(1  ) f1  [1  (1  )]g   g(1  )
(1  ) f1 +  f1  [1  (1  )]gg and (41)
 t =  =
(1  )[1  (1  )] [1   + g(1  )]
(1  ) f1  [1  (1  )]g   g(1  ) (42)
The solution for  obtained above needs to satisfy  > e: This is the case when:
(1  ) f1  [1  (1  )]g   g(1  )
f1 +  f1  [1  (1  )]gg >
(1  )[1  (1  )](1  )g
(1  )
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Rearranging the expression above yields:
 >
g(1  )
(1  )(1  )  g(1  )(1  )[1  (1  )]
b) Suppose t < e. Using the fact that  t = 1 in (40) we get:
(1  ) [1  (1  )]

=
1
1 
Rearranging, we obtain:
 =
(1  ) [1  (1  )]
1  (1  ) [1  (1  )]
Proof of Proposition 3. From (41) we can easily see that
@
@g
< 0: From (42) we
get:
@ 
@g
=
(1  )(1  )[1  (1  )](1  ) f f1  [1  (1  )]g+ 1g
f(1  ) f1  [1  (1  )]g   g(1  )g2 > 0
Proof of Proposition 4. From (41) we can easily see that
@
@
> 0. Using (37) we
get:
@ 
@
=  (1  )[1  (1  )]
1  [1  (1  )]
g(1  ) + (1  )g(1  )@
@
[(1  )]2 < 0
Proof of Proposition 5. From (41) we obtain:
@
@
=
 g(1  )[1  (1  )]
f(1  ) f1 +  f1  [1  (1  )]ggg2 < 0
Using (42) yields:
@ 
@
=
g(1  )(1  )[1  (1  )] f1 +  f1  [1  (1  )]gg
f(1  ) f1  [1  (1  )]g   g(1  )g2 > 0
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Appendix B
Calibration summary for the benchmark model
Parameter Value
Preferences
Altruism  0.06
Human capital production - rst stage
Second stage duration n2 0.133
Input elasticity of substitution

1
1+1

1 -0.4
1st stage share of private input  0.5
TFP - K-12 education B1 1
Human capital production - second stage
Elasticity of K-12 ed. in production of tertiary ed.  0.2
Input elasticity of substitution

1
1+2

2 -0.8
TFP - tertiary education B2 1.3
Output
TFP A 121
Elasticity of substitution

1
1+

 -0.35
Unskilled labor share  0.65
Government
Income tax  0.36
Public spending for education (%GDP) g 5.54%
Share of g spent on K-12  76%
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Sensitivity analysis
Parameter Value Private spending Tertiary ed.
Disp. inc. share K-12 share in  attainment
  
Elasticity of substitution -0.3 1.832 85.055 34.709
between skilled and unskilled  -0.35 1.832 85.326 34.619
labor (1 + ) 1 -0.4 1.832 85.634 34.509
1st stage human capital -0.3 2.000 87.033 34.425
elasticity 1 -0.4 1.832 85.326 34.619
-0.5 1.636 82.926 34.844
2nd stage human capital -0.9 1.690 96.054 33.173
elasticity 2 -0.8 1.832 85.326 34.619
-0.7 1.951 76.289 36.376
1st stage weight 0.1 1.855 75.711 36.510
in the 2nd stage  0.2 1.832 85.326 34.619
0.3 1.844 91.950 33.149
Unskilled labor share 0.6 1.854 76.060 41.827
in output  0.65 1.832 85.326 34.619
0.7 1.845 92.140 27.987
benchmark values in bold
Appendix C
Here we analyze the role of complementarity of resources between stages by study-
ing a more general human capital production function in the second stage, which is
a CES in the amount of human capital accumulated in the second stage and the
aggregate resources invested in the second stage:
h2t =

h 1t + (1  )
h
 e
 1
1t + (1  ) b 11t
i  
1
  1

where  2 [ 1;+1); 1 2 [ 1;+1); 0 <  < 1; 0 <  < 1:
This complementarity is captured by the importance attached to the amount of hu-
man capital accumulated in the rst stage, which can be interpreted as a "preparation
e¤ect". Thus,  controls for the strength of this e¤ect. For relatively low values of
 the human capital acquired in the rst stage can be easily replaced by adding
extra-resources in the second stage (for example, remedial classes). As  increases,
K-12 human capital is more instrumental in producing tertiary education. While 
is responsible for the substitution elasticity between rst stage human capital and
second stage spending,  reects the how much the early human capital contributes
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quantitatively to the college type human capital.
We vary the degree of complementarity between the level of preparation achieved
and the amount of resources invested. The sensitivity analysis is shown in the table
below.
Parameter Value Private spending Tertiary ed.
Share in disp. inc. K-12 share in  attainment
  
elasticity between -0.1 1.833 84.499 34.759
1st stage human capital  0 1.832 85.326 34.619
and 2nd stage spending 0.1 1.832 86.140 34.480
benchmark values in bold
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